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 Zusammenfassung 
Diese Arbeit befasst sich mit dem „alten“ Thema der Kontexteffekte beim Wahlverhalten. 
Neue Techniken der Multi-Level-Analyse bieten ein mächtiges Instrument, mit dem 
regionale Einflüsse auf Wahlentscheidungen (neu) untersucht werden können. Die Multi-
Level-Analyse wird auf deutsche Wahldaten angewendet und weist zwei Kontexteffekte 
nach. Die Arbeitslosenquote des Wahlkreises hat einen positiven Effekt auf die 
Unterstützung der SPD, was dem regionalen Äquivalent des Modells des „economic 
voting“ entspricht. Außerdem wirkt sich die allgemeine Stärke einer Partei in einem Kreis 
positiv auf die individuelle Entscheidung aus, diese Partei zu unterstützen. Dieses zweite 
Ergebnis bestätigt die Annahme, die als „Breakage“ bezeichnet wird. Beide Effekte zeigen, 
dass individuelle Wahlentscheidungen in Deutschland weiterhin regionalen Einflüssen 
unterliegen. 
Abstract 
This paper addresses the “old” topic of contextual effects on voting behaviour. Current 
multilevel analysis techniques provide a powerful tool to (re-)examine such regional influ-
ences on individual voting decisions. We apply multilevel analysis to German electoral 
data. Our results prove evidence of two contextual effects. The unemployment level of the 
district has a positive effect on SPD support, which confirms the local equivalent of the 
economic vote model. Furthermore the global strength of a party in a district has a positive 
effect on the individual decision to support that party. This is a confirmation of what has 
been labelled as breakage. Both effects demonstrate the continuing impact of the locality 
on individual vote preferences in Germany. 

 Jan Pickery 
Contextual Effects on the Vote in Germany 
A Multilevel Analysis 
1 Introduction 
Contextual effects on voting behaviour have been discussed for a long time. Theory and 
research about such contextual effects go back for at least 50 years. Political sociologists 
have often studied regional differences in voting behaviour and regularly tried to explain 
these differences in terms of contextual effects. New statistical methodologies, more par-
ticularly multilevel analysis, allow for a readdressing of an old problem with a more pow-
erful technique. Accordingly, in the last decade multilevel analysis has been used a few 
times for the analysis of voting behaviour (see e.g. Charnock, 1997 and Lubbers et al. 
2000). In this paper we will apply multilevel analysis to German electoral data in order to 
find evidence (or absence) of contextual effects in Germany. 
Germany is clearly a multiparty system with 4 (in the West) or 5 (in the East) parties 
achieving a ‘non-ignorable’ share of the votes.1 Accordingly a multinomial logit model for 
multi-category responses is an appropriate tool to analyse voting behaviour. We will pre-
sent a multilevel multinomial logit model that accounts for regional differences. As this 
model has not been applied widely up until now, especially not in political science, we will 
also describe the model itself. Applying that model, we will be able to demonstrate con-
textual effects on the vote. The interpretation of our results can also further clarify the 
nature of these effects. 
In the next section we review theories and research about contextual effects on voting 
behaviour. In section 3 we describe the data and the variables used in our models. Section 
4 presents the model we will use and the modelling strategy we will follow in our analyses. 
Section 5 shows the results and section 6 concludes this paper. 
                                                 
1   We will analyse data from 1994. In the elections of that year, CDU/CSU, SPD, FDP, and Bündnis 
90/Die Grünen achieved together 95.2% of the list votes (Zweitstimme) in former West-Germany, FDP 
being the smallest of these with 7.7%. In former East-Germany the PDS was also strong (19.8%). PDS, 
CDU, SPD, FDP, and Bündnis 90/Die Grünen covered together 97.6%, FDP again being the smallest 
with 3.5%. 
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2 Contextual effects on voting behaviour 
Apparent geographical differences in voting behaviour have been studied for a long time. 
These differences are however not necessarily the result of a contextual effect. Contextual 
effects are systematic differences in individual (voting) behaviour across environments that 
cannot be explained in terms of individual characteristics. When the differences between 
individuals in distinct regions account for the different voting behaviour, this variation 
cannot be interpreted as a contextual effect. 
One of the first arguments for a contextual effect on the vote can be found in an early 
fifties study by Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee (1954-1986). These authors show how 
voting is affected by social class, religious background, family loyalties and other factors. 
They also argue that the personal network of an individual is very important in shaping his 
or her political preference. Individuals tend to comply with the general preference in their 
network. If preferences in the personal network are diverse though, an impact of the larger 
community would be possible. The surrounding majority would attract individuals with a 
diverse network. Over a long period of time this “breakage“ effect, as the authors call it, 
would result in an enduring general support for one party in a community. The strongest 
party tends to remain the strongest (ibid.: 100-101). This contextual effect can result in 
enduring geographical differences in the vote. 
Several authors have studied this effect and provided further explanations for it. Klein 
and Pötsche (2000) cite three theories that have been used to explain the breakage effect: 
party activity, identification or interaction theory. Party activity theory states that locally 
strong parties can and will carry on a more intensive election campaign, which further 
attracts new voters. According to the identification theory people identify with their area or 
region and consequently adopt subjectively acknowledged opinions and (majority) cli-
mates in the region. Following interaction theory, connections between people from the 
same locality and their social interaction result in an impact of the locality on the individ-
ual vote. There is plenty of research on these explanations. Cutright e.g. (1963) focuses 
exclusively on local party activity. Analysing strong Democratic and Republican precints 
he does not find evidence for the hypothesis that the majority effect in voting behaviour 
exists as the consequence of political party activities. Fitton (1973) examines personal 
interaction in the street environment and Pattie and Johnston (1999) present some analyses 
that suggest that political conversation forms a distinct context within which people evalu-
ate parties and decide who to support. Conversations with supporters of a particular party 
encourage respondents to vote for it too and discourage them from voting for other parties.  
Whatever explanation of the effect is most valid, one can easily argue that the breakage 
effect is also transferable to a multiparty system, where there is no clear strongest party. 
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Interaction with partisans, party activity and identification will probably be stronger if a 
certain party is stronger in the region, regardless of whether this party has the (absolute) 
majority or not. One can also argue that this breakage effect should have decreased during 
the last decades due to individualisation and modernisation processes in society. As Klein 
and Pötsche (2000: 188-190) also point out people change local and social contexts more 
often nowadays and they are geographically more mobile. The result is a weaker identifi-
cation and a wider interaction. Furthermore election campaigns are increasingly centrally 
organised and directed. Consequently Klein and Pötsche expect contextual effects on the 
vote to be less important, an hypothesis which is supported by their analysis. Their findings 
even seem to suggest that contextual effects have no significant importance anymore for 
individual voting decisions in Germany nowadays. Although the argument about the 
decreasing impact is clear and well founded, this last claim is probably too strong, since 
the authors do not take the categorical nature of the dependent variable fully into account. 
Much attention has also been paid to class contextual effects on the vote (see e.g. Fisher, 
2000). A class contextual effect implies that similar people vote differently depending on 
the class composition of their locality. People living in areas with a higher proportion of 
working class people would become more socialist, for example. Explanations for this 
effect are however similar to the explanations for the breakage effect. Fisher (2000: 348-
349) recites three explanations. Authors revert to social interaction, political socialisation 
or local political culture to explain the effect. As Fisher points out all explanations are in 
fact more shifting the focus from the class based aspect to a contextual effect associated 
with partisanship. As such this class contextual effect is rather a further explication of this 
breakage effect than something really different. His analysis proves evidence of an impact 
of the percentage employers or managers in a ward on an individual’s probability to vote 
Conservative. Also addressing class contextual effects, Andersen and Heath (2000) inves-
tigate changes over time, like Klein and Pötsche. Unlike the results of those authors their 
results provide significant evidence for the continuing role of contextual social class on 
voting in Britain. “Paradoxically, while the relationship between individual’s own class 
positions and their voting decisions have declined over time, the relationship between their 
voting decisions and the class composition of the constituency in which they live has 
remained effectively stable.” (Andersen and Heath, 2000: 20). 
Another focus in contextual voting research is on the effects of race, see e.g. Carsey 
(1995). A number of earlier American studies cited by Carsey have showed that white vot-
ers living in increasingly black counties and/or states become increasingly likely to vote in 
a manner considered hostile to black interests. As Carsey points out this effect contrasts 
with theories arguing for positive contextual influence on the behaviour of non-group 
members (like the class contextual effects theory). According to Carsey this contradiction 
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might be result of the level of aggregation. The effect of the class composition of a 
neighbourhood is probably different from the effect of the class composition of the state. 
Carsey’s analysis that focuses on the neighbourhood shows indeed that the contextual 
effects of race are not so different from the contextual effects of factors like partisanship or 
social class. Addressing the same problem, Wright (1977) on the other hand finds a nega-
tive effect at the state as well as at the community level. Higher concentrations of blacks 
lead to more voting behaviour that can be interpreted as hostile to black. Lubbers et al. 
tackle the same research problem in Europe. They use multilevel models to analyse 
extreme right voting behaviour and voting intentions in France, Germany and Flan-
ders/Belgium (votes for “Front National,” “Republikaner,” and “Vlaams Blok” respec-
tively). Individual variables in the analysis include occupational status, education and 
political attitudes. Regional variables are the unemployment level and the number of ethnic 
minorities. In all analyses they find increasing support for extreme right as the proportion 
of ethnic minorities gets higher (Lubbers and Scheepers, 2000; Lubbers and Scheepers, 
2002; Lubbers, Scheepers and Billiet, 2000). They rely on the realistic conflict theory to 
explain ethnocentric attitudes and voting behaviour. According to this theory the competi-
tion over scarce resources causes intergroup conflict. Contextual conditions will reinforce 
this conflict. The competition along ethnic lines will be more severe in regions where 
immigration and unemployment levels are high or in regions where these numbers are 
increasing considerably. Existing ethnic boundaries are reinforced when the actual compe-
tition over scarce resources intensifies. To preserve a positive self-image outgroups are 
blamed for the increased competition and ascribed negative characteristics. Thus more 
severe competition may intensify social (contra-)identification and eventually may result in 
exclusionist reactions. It is precisely these exclusionist reactions that are proclaimed in 
extreme right wing programmes, which increase the attractiveness of the extreme right-
wing in regions and times characterized by high competition. Competition theory can thus 
be used to explain contextual effects on right wing voting.  
Pattie, Fieldhouse and Johnston (1995) also have an interest in local unemployment lev-
els. According to the economic vote model, governments which preside over economic 
downturn will lose support, and perhaps power, while those who are in power during boom 
periods see their approval increase. These authors argue however that this theory and the 
analyses based on it tend to ignore the existence of regional and local variations in eco-
nomic conditions. Therefore the main interest of their paper is the link between the local 
economic context and voting decisions. They find evidence of economic vote model at the 
local level: unemployment, while generally seen as an unimportant factor in voting deci-
sions in national models, emerges as an important factor at the local level: its importance 
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as an influence on the vote is obscured in studies which fail to take into account its wide 
variations between different constituencies. 
Kelley and McAllister (1985) finally represent the deviating opinion in this section. As 
they correctly point out, the social context in which a person lives is related to a wide vari-
ety of politically relevant individual-level variables. To examine contextual effects, these 
factors have to be controlled for in the analysis, something which, according to these 
authors, hasn’t been done sufficiently in previous analyses. The final conclusion of their 
analysis is that the social characteristics of parliamentary constituencies have no significant 
effect on how their inhabitants vote, net of the voter’s own characteristics. Said differently: 
social context has no significant importance in shaping voting behaviour in Britain once 
sufficient control variables are introduced.  
In section 5 we will try to integrate these findings in multilevel analyses of German 
electoral data. Controlling for the relevant individual characteristics we will examine 
whether the regional variables (unemployment level, proportion of foreigners and general 
party support) have an effect on voting preferences, thus providing evidence for contextual 
effects. For class structure an indirect test with a proxy (employment structure) will be 
used. In the next section we further describe these variables and the individual characteris-
tics in the analyses.  
3 Data and variables in the models 
We will use data from the pre-election study 1994 (ZA 2599)2 and analyse the West-Ger-
man part of it (“alte Bundesländer”). This choice is at least partly driven by practical con-
siderations. First of all, we needed an indicator variable that for each respondent identifies 
the region, municipality or district he or she is living in. Not all election surveys in Ger-
many have such a variable, but in the 1994 pre-election study it is available. Secondly the 
number of respondents is important as well. Recent post election surveys in Germany exist 
of about 2000 respondents. Due to very different voting behaviour and voting intentions, 
East- and West-Germany (the new and the old Bundesländer) should be separated in the 
analysis. When using a post-election study, the result would be a dataset of about 1000 
respondents, which is very small for an multilevel model with a categorical response. We 
attempt to include the diversity of voting intentions in the analysis and therefore need a 
                                                 
2   The data used in this paper were made available by Zentral Archiv für Empirische Sozialforschung 
(ZA), Universität zu Köln. The data were originally collected by M. Berger, M. Jung, D. Roth from 
IPOS Mannheim and W.G. Gibowski from Bundespresseamt. ZA documented the data and prepared 
them for analysis. Neither ZA, nor the original collectors-researchers are responsible for the analyses or 
interpretations presented in this paper. 
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model with a multiple category response, which needs even more cases to be estimated. 
So, the number of observations of the cumulated data set of the 1994 pre-election study 
(more than 10000 in West-Germany alone) was an important aspect. A disadvantage of this 
data set is a direct consequence of the nature of the survey. As it was a pre-election survey 
only voting intentions are known and not voting behaviour.3 Although a strong correlation 
between both can easily be assumed, results might have been more convincing with actual 
voting behaviour variables. 
The voting intention is our dependent variable. Respondents were asked which candidate 
and which party they would vote for, if there would have been an election at the next sun-
day. We examine the party intention (list vote or “Zweitstimme”) and include the 4 major 
parties (CDU/CSU, SPD, FDP and Bündnis 90/Die Grünen) in the analysis. 
The data set contains a bunch of individual level variables that can be used as explana-
tory variables. We included sex, age, family status, education, employment status, 
employment category, confession and mass attendance. Al variables are transformed into 
one or more dummies. Female has the value 1 for women and 0 for men. Age was already 
categorised. We turned the 10 categories into 3 with 2 dummies as a result: young (-35) 
and old (+50). The middle in between these ages is thus the reference category. From fam-
ily status we only retained married (or not). For education we grouped “no finished educa-
tion” and primary school into low education, whereas final exam (“Abitur”) and everything 
above became high education. Employment status resulted in 5 dummies: full time occu-
pied, half time occupied, unemployed, retired and houseman or housewife. The rest cate-
gory is the reference. Employment category was transformed into 5 dummies: labourer, 
office worker, functionary, self-employed (or shopkeeper) and farmer. For confession we 
included Catholic and Protestant. Finally regular (mass) attender denotes respondents 
who go to church every Sunday or almost every Sunday. 
Of the respondents in this data set also the district (“Kreis”) in which they live is known. 
These administrative units will make up the geographical level of our analysis. This choice 
is also partly driven by practical considerations. A lot of information is collected at the 
district level. For some characteristics districts are the smallest geographical units for 
which information is available in official publications. A yearly publication of the German 
National Statistical Office (Statistisches Bundesamt) contains population and employment 
characteristics and geographical variables for all districts (Kreiszahlen). The 1995 and 
1996 editions include the data for 1994 that we need. The unemployment level and the 
proportion of foreigners can be borrowed straightforwardly, but exact class contextual 
                                                 
3   The survey asked for previous voting behaviour in national and European elections. These variables are 
however not an alternative, since at least part of the respondents were not allowed to vote at these previ-
ous elections and, more importantly, that voting behaviour not univocally can be attributed to a region 
due to possible respondent removals. 
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variables, like the proportion of labourers and the proportion of employers or managers are 
not available. The publication does however describe the distribution of employees over 
different sectors. In these official statistics the working force is partitioned into 5 sectors: 
resulting in 5 percentages as district variables. Sector 1 denotes the percentage working in 
agriculture, forestry and fishing, sector 2 the percentage working in industrial manufacto-
ries, sector 3 the percentage working in trade, traffic and news services, sector 4 the per-
centage working in other service companies and sector 5 the percentage working in gov-
ernment services, private housekeeping and private organisations without profit aims. In 
our analyses we will sum up the sector 3 and sector 4 percentages since the last sector is 
somewhat unclear and they are probably indicators of a similar employment structure. 
They are also positively correlated (0.45), whereas most of these sector percentages are 
(strongly) negatively correlated, just because they are percentages. Furthermore, the 
hypotheses would be the same for both the sector 3 and the sector 4 variable. The sector 
variables certainly do not exactly measure the class composition of a district. They can 
however partly be used as proxies. It is justifiable to assume a strong correlation between 
the proportion of labourers in a district and the proportion of the employed people working 
in industrial manufactories. A correlation between the percentage of higher level employ-
ees and the percentage working in sector 3 or sector 4 can also be expected, but it is proba-
bly not so strong. Apart from these two proxies, this employment structure partitioning 
allows for an examination of an additional class contextual effect. The CDU/CSU is his-
torically the party of the farmers, more than any other party. Following class contextual 
theory one can hypothesize that the proportion working in sector 1 has a net effect on the 
probability to vote CDU/CSU, whether or not the respondent is a farmer him or herself. 
The last district variable we need is the general support for the various parties. This can 
easily be measured by the election results. The results of the German general elections of 
1994 for all districts are available in another publication of the Statistical Office (Bevöl-
kerung und Erwerbstätigkeit) dedicated to this election. For this variable we look at the 
distribution of the list votes (Zweitstimme). 
4 Method 
To model information of various levels simultaneously multilevel analysis is used. Several 
multilevel models are possible, but during the last decade the random coefficients model 
has become the dominant one in the social sciences. In a random coefficients model, the 
variance of the dependent variable is decomposed into an individual and a group compo-
nent. The specific trait of the model is not the functional form relating lower and higher 
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level variables, but rather a more sophisticated treatment of the error structure (DiPrete and 
Forristal, 1994: 334). In our analyses the variance in voting intention will be divided in a 
respondent and a district part and we will examine the effect of respondent and district 
variables on both variances. 
The dependent variable is a four category variable. Such a variable can be analysed with 
a multinomial logit model. The multinomial logit model is a generalized logits model; it 
models different logits simultaneously. These logits are the logs of the fractions of the 
expected probabilities for the different categories of the dependent variable. The model is 
described e.g. in Stokes et al. (1995: 233-246). Goldstein (1995: 104-106) and Hedeker 
present the multilevel extension. Consider a 2-level model with two independent level 1 
variables, a nominal response variable with t categories, and a varying constant at the 
higher level. Then the model is defined as: 
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In this formula: i indexes the level 1 units, the respondents, j the level 2 units, the districts, 
πij is the expected value (proportion) of the response for the ijth respondent, β0 is the inter-
cept and β1 and β2 are the regression coefficients for the independent level 1 variables x1ij 
and x2ij, u0j is the level 2 residual for the intercept, s = 1, …, t - 1. The formula clarifies that 
there are separate intercept parameters (β0(s)) and different regression parameters (β1(s) and 
β2(s)) for each logit. In fact t-1 logits are modelled and coefficients are fitted for each 
response category except from the base. When there are only 2 categories in the dependent 
variable, the model becomes an ‘ordinary’ logit model with a binomial response. This 
model can be extended by including more individual independent variables, independent 
district variables and/or random terms for the regression coefficients. (In the formula above 
there is no higher level variation for β1(s) and β2(s)). The model is completed by specifying a 
distribution for the observed response yij|πij. The standard assumption is that the observed 
proportions follow a multinomial distribution (details see Goldstein, 1995: 105). 
As said before, in our analysis the level 1 units are the respondents, and the districts con-
stitute the second level. The dependent variable is voting intention and t equals 4. We 
chose SPD as the base category and model 3 (t-1) logits: the log odds for an intended 
CDU/CSU vote instead of a SPD vote, the log odds for a FDP vote instead of a SPD vote 
and the log odds for a vote for die Grünen instead of a SPD vote. With random terms at the 
second level we allow for variation in these log odds between districts. We include respon-
dent and district characteristics that can explain this variation.  
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This model can be implemented in programs like MIXNO and MlwiN.4 
In the next section we will present the results of our MLwiN analyses. We will describe 
a succession of models. The first model will be a null model, a model without independent 
variables. That model allows us to assess the share of the variance that can be attributed to 
the district. Secondly we will enter the individual (respondent) variables. With this second 
analysis we examine whether there is still regional variation in voting intention when con-
trolling for the individual characteristics. Subsequently we will include district variables 
thus trying to explain the remaining regional variance. We have 7 district variables to 
include in the models: 4 sectors (1 of them is a compound one), the district support for the 
parties and the unemployment level and the proportion of foreigners. These 7 variables are 
however strongly correlated. For the sector variables this is obvious as they sum up to 
100%, resulting in negative correlations up to -0.730. But high (positive or negative) cor-
relations can be observed for the other variables as well. So is the correlation between the 
proportion of foreigners and the sector 1 (agriculture) percentage -0,626 and amounts the 
correlation between the unemployment level and the share of SPD votes to 0.716. These 
high correlations will introduce multicolinearity in the analysis, which complicates inter-
pretation. Coefficients will shift between models as section 5 shows. Therefore we do not 
include all district variables immediately. We start with the employment structure variables 
that allow for a (proxy) test of the class contextual effects. Next we include the unemploy-
ment level and the proportion of foreigners to test the local economic vote model and the 
contradicting hypotheses about the impact of the ethnic composition. As far as this last trait 
is concerned, it has to be noted that an extreme right or clearly anti-immigrant party is not 
included in our analysis. In order to explore the relationship between ethnic context and 
voting more thoroughly an inclusion of immigrant-hostile (extreme right) voting intentions 
would be necessary. That would however highly complicate our analysis because of the 
small number of extreme right supporters in the data set. In the final model we will include 
the general support for the various parties in the districts. We retained this variable for the 
                                                 
4   To fit multinomial models in MLwiN you need to use the multicat macros. The Windows facilities are 
rather small for these models (see Yang et al. 1999: 5-10). In MLwiN you choose the base category and 
create a new response variable, which is a transformation of the original response variable. It is a stack-
ing of created dummies, which implies that the dataset is doubled, tripled, … according to the number of 
categories in the dependent variables: 3, 4, … So in our analysis the original data set is tripled. You also 
have to create new independent variables. These are products of the original predictor variables with the 
dummies for the response variable, which implies they get the value zero for a large part of the new 
dataset (2/3 in our analysis). This is a time consuming activity, but in a way it also clarifies the model 
you are fitting. For example you get a parameter estimate for each created predictor, which corresponds 
to the different regression coefficients for the variables for each logit. The assumption of the multino-
mial distribution is imposed by creating an artificial level 1. (This is done by the macros, you don’t have 
to do it yourself). The variances at level 1 and level 2 (the original first level) are constrained, but these 
constraints can be released to allow for extra multinomial variation. At level 3 the variation between the 
higher level units is measured. In our case we have to look at this level to evaluate district variation. 
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last model, since its effect is likely to be strong. In the analysis of Fisher (2000) for exam-
ple, it was the higher level variable with the strongest effect. It also rendered all other 
higher level variables not significant. Since this breakage effect (or partisan reinforcement 
effect as Fisher calls it) is not an explanation in itself (see also section 2), it is worth 
examining the effect of the other district variables without this variable in the model. 
5 Results of the analysis 
The results of the analyses are reported in Tables 1 to 4. We present 4 different models to 
clarify the modelling strategy following the argument in the previous section. These tables 
also clarify that we chose SPD as the base category. We get parameter estimates for 
CDU/CSU, FDP and Die Grünen. 
The first table presents the null model. In this model no independent variables are 
included. The model estimates an intercept for the three parties and decomposes the vari-
ance in the dependent variable in an individual and a district part. Remember that the first 
level is an artificial level imposed by the model assumptions. 
 
Table 1: Results of the Null Model 
Fixed Part 
 CDU/CSU FDP Die Grünen 
 parameter s.e.  parameter s.e.  parameter s.e.  
Level 1 – Individual 
constant -0.023 0.030  -1.931 0.047 ** -1.314 0.044 ** 
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01 
Random Part 
 parameter s.e.  corr 
Level 3 – District     
σ2CDU 0.131 0.021   
σFDP/CDU  0.095 0.023  0.727 
σ2FDP  0.131 0.048   
σDie Grünen/CDU  0.091 0.022  0.493 
σDie Grünen/FDP  0.144 0.035  0.779 
σ2Die Grünen  0.260 0.047   
Level 2 – Individual 
-P/P 1.000 0.000 °  
Level 1 – Multinomial Variance 
σ2e  1.000 0.000 °  
° constrained 
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In a null model the intercepts reflect the distribution over the different categories of the 
dependent variable. All intercepts are negative, reflecting the position of the SPD as the 
party with the largest support in these data. The intercept for CDU/CSU is very close to 0 
though and not significant, so support for both parties is about equal. But the number of 
respondents expressing their intention to vote for Die Grünen and even more for the FDP 
is—of course—considerably smaller. 
The random part at level 3 represents the variation across districts in general support for 
the three parties. More accurately, it reproduces the variances of the district residuals for 
the three logits (CDU/CSU|SPD, FDP|SPD, Die Grünen|SPD) and the covariances of these 
residuals. For the random part, significance tests based on standard errors are only indica-
tive (Longford, 1999). But all variance and covariance terms are at least three times as 
large as their standard errors, except from σ2FDP, which is still larger than 2.5 times its stan-
dard error. So it is legitimate to conclude that there is regional variation in recorded voting 
intention: support for the various parties is not equal in all districts. This result can be clari-
fied further with a graph that shows the district residuals for a party and an interval that 
allows comparison with the other districts. Figure 1 displays this picture for Die Grünen. 
 
Figure 1: District Residuals with Error Bars in the Null Model for Die Grünen 
 
For all districts in the data set, the black triangle represents the residual for the logit Die 
Grünen|SPD. When looking at these residuals we can examine exceptional districts. At the 
far right hand side of the graph is a district with a very high residual. The logit Die 
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Grünen|SPD is much higher in this district than in all other districts. Moreover it is signifi-
cantly higher than about 250 other district residuals. Its error bar shows no overlap with the 
error bars of the first 250 districts.5 Either Die Grünen have relatively very strong support 
in the district or support for the SPD is extremely low, or both. Apart from this exceptional 
district the graph shows that there are lots of districts with significantly residuals: about 40 
districts at the left hand side of the graph have significantly lower residuals than about 40 
districts at the right hand side. So this graph proves evidence for the district variation in the 
logit of interest. 
Apart from the variances, the random part of Table 1 also presents covariances and 
correlations of the residuals. All covariances are positive. That is not surprising since all 
parameters are relative to the SPD. It is highly likely that in districts where Die Grünen are 
doing relatively well compared to the SPD, other parties are also doing relatively well 
compared to the SPD, just because the SPD is probably not doing very well in those 
districts. This positive correlation can also be reproduced graphically. Figure 2 represents 
the correlation between the residuals for Die Grünen and those for the FDP. 
The graph clearly shows the high positive correlation (0.779) between both residuals. 
Looking at the 1994 election results in all districts there is also a rather strong positive cor-
relation between both party results: 0.595. In districts where the FDP is performing well, 
Die Grünen also have stronger support. The correlation which results from this model is 
higher, because of the relative nature of the parameters. Of course the data are not exactly 
the same either: these data describe voting intentions in a sample and not the actual elec-
tion results in the population. 
In multilevel analyses often an intra-class correlation is used to express the share of vari-
ance which can be attributed to the higher level, in our analyses the district level. The 
assumption of a multinomial variance implies a level 1 variance of π2/3 (≈ 3.29) (see 
Snijders and Bosker, 1999; Hedeker, 2001).6 Doing so we can compute 3 intra-class 
correlations for the 3 logits. For Die Grünen for example, we have: 
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5   These district errors are sample estimates with an amount of uncertainty. They have standard errors that 
depend on the number of respondents in the district and the between and within district variation (Gold-
stein and Thomas, 1996: 161). Using these standard errors one can compare the residuals. Comparing 
districts involves however a series of statistical tests. For these test the intervals should be computed by 
multiplying the standard errors with ±1.4 (instead of ±1.96) for a significance level of α = 0.05 (see 
Goldstein and Healy, 1995, for details). A graphical representation of the residuals with the [±1.4] confi-
dence intervals shows the significant non-overlap between districts. 
6   π is the number denoted by the Greek letter (3.14159…). It should not be confused with the proportion 
in formula (1). 
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So about 7% of the variance in the logit Die Grünen|SPD can be attributed to the district 
level. The rest is variation between individuals. For CDU/CSU|SPD and FDP|SPD the 
share is only about 4%. Regional variation in intended voting behaviour is larger for Die 
Grünen than for CDU/CSU and FDP, but in general it is rather moderate. There is much 
more variation between individuals than between districts.7 
 
Figure 2: District Residuals for Die Grünen and for the FDP in the Null Model 
 
This first analysis proves evidence of geographical variation in voting intentions. It is 
however not a prove of a contextual effect on that intention. For such a prove it is neces-
sary to control for relevant individual characteristics (see also the Kelley and McAllister 
argument in section 2). In the second analysis we include the independent respondent vari-
ables. The results are reported in Table 2. In this model, we only included the respondent 
variables that were significant for at least one of the three parties. 
The fixed coefficients can be interpreted by transforming them into odds ratios. Female 
e.g. is a dummy (0 = male, 1 = female). Its parameter estimate for FDP|SPD equals -0.182, 
which corresponds with an odds ratio of 0.833 (= e-0.182). Thus the odds FDP|SPD for 
women equal 0.833 times the same odds for men. In other words the FDP attract relatively  
 
                                                 
7   This computation is based on the variance estimates of the higher level residuals. As we do not take the 
covariance between the residuals into account, the intra-class correlations that are reported are approxi-
mate instead of really exact figures. 
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Table 2: Results of the Model with Individual Level Characteristics 
Fixed Part 
 CDU/CSU FDP Die Grünen 
 parameter s.e.  parameter s.e.  parameter s.e.  
Level 1 – Individual 
constant -0.929 0.108 ** -2.136 0.197 ** -0.504 0.134  
female -0.036 0.050  -0.182 0.094 * 0.194 0.070 * 
young 0.089 0.060  -0.237 0.119 * -0.064 0.077  
old 0.577 0.063 ** 0.631 0.112 ** -0.762 0.116 ** 
low education -0.232 0.054 ** -0.380 0.111 ** -0.555 0.092 ** 
high education 0.064 0.058  0.671 0.104 ** 0.787 0.077 ** 
married 0.076 0.046  -0.168 0.088  -0.333 0.069 ** 
full time 0.062 0.062  -0.027 0.120  -0.386 0.079 ** 
half time -0.253 0.090 ** -0.346 0.187  -0.098 0.115  
retired 0.060 0.079  -0.458 0.153 ** -0.883 0.175 ** 
self employed 1.070 0.076 ** 1.322 0.116 ** 0.576 0.116 ** 
farmer 1.780 0.199 ** 1.829 0.302 ** 1.600 0.353 ** 
labourer -0.293 0.060 ** -0.462 0.137 ** -0.033 0.101  
catholic 0.802 0.072 ** 0.323 0.127 * -0.205 0.087 * 
protestant 0.274 0.070 ** 0.126 0.121  -0.529 0.085 ** 
regular attender 1.028 0.062 ** 0.517 0.121 ** -0.040 0.118  
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01 
Random Part 
 parameter s.e.  corr 
Level 3 – District     
σ2CDU 0.098 0.019   
σFDP/CDU  0.067 0.020  0.705 
σ2FDP  0.090 0.042   
σDie Grünen/CDU  0.098 0.020  0.659 
σDie Grünen/FDP  0.106 0.030  0.758 
σ2Die Grünen  0.200 0.041   
Level 2 – Individual 
-P/P 1.000 0.000 °  
Level 1 – Multinomial Variance 
σ2e  1.000 0.000 °  
° constrained 
 
fewer women. Similarly a positive coefficient means higher support among the respective 
category. Consequently, the CDU/CSU has relatively more support among older respon-
dents, respondents who are self-employed or farmer and among catholic and protestant 
respondents and regular mass attenders. Respondents with a lower education, respondents 
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with a half time labour contract and respondents working as a labourer are relatively less 
likely to express a CDU/CSU voting intention. The FDP also has relatively more support 
among older respondents, self-employed respondents and farmers and among catholic 
respondents and regular mass attenders. Less support for the FDP is there among younger 
respondents, retired respondents, respondents working as labourers and respondents with a 
lower education. Die Grünen are doing relatively badly among lower educated respondents 
as well as among older respondents, married respondents, respondents working full time 
and retired respondents and among catholic and protestant respondents. They do however 
attract relatively more women, higher educated respondents, self-employed respondents 
and farmers. 
For all parties we find a lot of significant predictors of the voting intention. Mind that 
these coefficients are partial and relative to the SPD. When comparing raw percentages for 
farmers for example, it will become clear that only the CDU/CSU has apparent support 
among farmers (although there aren’t that many anyway). It is mainly because the SPD is 
attractive to so few farmers (the difference in SPD support between non-farmers and farm-
ers amounts to 30%) that the FDP and Die Grünen have a positive coefficient for this vari-
able. The encountered relationships are however not of main interest here. The impact of 
including these variables on the random part of the model is more important for us. Apart 
from one covariance term in the model (σDie Grünen/CDU) all terms in the random part of the 
model have decreased considerably: if we don’t take that covariance into account, the 
average decrease is about 25%. We can show further evidence of this decrease with a 
similar graph for Die Grünen as the one presented after analysis 1. Figure 3 presents the 
district residuals and the error bars for analysis 2 for the logit Die Grünen|SPD. 
The differences between Figure 3 and Figure 1 are rather small. There is for example 
still one outlier at the far right hand side with a residual which is a lot larger than the 
others. But in general the residuals have decreased somewhat. As a result of a similar 
decrease in standard errors though, the number of districts that differ significantly from 
each other remains apparently the same. 
Figure 3 pictures the residual results of analysis 2 for Die Grünen, but these results are 
the same for all parties. The residuals have decreased, implying that part of the regional 
variation in voting intentions is due to individual characteristics. Support for the political 
parties varies across districts, but this variation is partly a consequence of differences 
between the individuals of the various districts. We can explain part of the variation with 
individual characteristics. On the other hand, after controlling for the individual variables 
in the model there are still differences between the districts. All variances and covariances 
at the district level remain substantial. Again, significance tests based on the standard 
errors are only approximate, but all ratios are considerably larger than two times their stan-
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dard errors, except from σ2FDP, for which the ratio parameter/standard error is close to 2. 
Consequently, the results prove evidence for a geographical effect apart from individual 
characteristics: a contextual effect! In the following analyses we try to explain this con-
textual effect with district characteristics. 
 
Figure 3: District Residuals with Error Bars for Die Grünen in the Model with 
Independent Individual Characteristics 
 
In analysis 3 we start by including variables that relate to the employment structure of the 
districts. In the official regional statistics the working force is partitioned into 5 sectors, 
resulting in 5 percentages as district variables. We added the sector 3 and sector 4 
percentages up, since they both refer to the service sector. Of course it is impossible to 
include all 4 variables in the model, as they sum up to 100% and would introduce perfect 
multicolinearity. We tried various combinations of three sector variables, but the results 
were always equal. The sector 3/4 and sector 5 variables had no significant effects. Model 
3 shows the results with sector 1, the percentage working in agriculture, forestry and 
fishing, and sector 2, the percentage working in industrial manufactories.  
The fixed effects of the individual characteristics in this model remain the same as the 
ones in the previous analysis. The inclusion of higher level variables has no substantial 
impact on their size nor on their interpretation. The two employment structure variables 
have a significant contribution for at least one party. A higher sector 1 percentage in the 
district where a respondent lives increases his or her chance to report a CDU/CSU vote  
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Table 3: Results of the Model with Individual Characteristics and Employment Sectors 
Fixed Part 
 CDU/CSU FDP Die Grünen 
 parameter s.e.  parameter s.e.  parameter s.e.  
Level 1 – Individual 
constant -0.975 0.153 ** -2.204 0.254 ** -0.172 0.210  
female -0.037 0.050  -0.183 0.094 * 0.192 0.070 * 
young 0.083 0.060  -0.235 0.119 * -0.061 0.077  
old 0.585 0.063 ** 0.628 0.112 ** -0.762 0.116 ** 
low education -0.239 0.054 ** -0.371 0.111 ** -0.558 0.092 ** 
high education 0.074 0.059  0.669 0.104 ** 0.779 0.077 ** 
married 0.068 0.047  -0.155 0.088  -0.323 0.069 ** 
full time 0.056 0.062  -0.013 0.120  -0.382 0.079 ** 
half time -0.256 0.090 ** -0.334 0.187 ** -0.087 0.115 ** 
retired 0.060 0.079  -0.461 0.153 ** -0.875 0.174 ** 
self employed 1.062 0.076 ** 1.327 0.116 ** 0.569 0.116 ** 
farmer 1.747 0.199 ** 1.933 0.298 ** 1.607 0.353 ** 
labourer -0.299 0.060 ** -0.459 0.136 * -0.026 0.101  
catholic 0.783 0.072 ** 0.343 0.127 ** -0.190 0.087 * 
Protestant 0.268 0.070 ** 0.137 0.121 ** -0.526 0.085 ** 
regular attender 1.013 0.062 ** 0.544 0.121  -0.033 0.118  
Level 2 – District 
sector 1 0.026 0.008 ** -0.043 0.016 ** 0.008 0.013  
sector 2 -0.001 0.003  0.005 0.005  -0.010 0.005 * 
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01 
Random Part 
 parameter s.e.  corr 
Level 3 – District     
σ2CDU 0.089 0.018   
σFDP/CDU  0.074 0.019  0.830 
σ2FDP  0.086 0.041   
σDie Grünen/CDU  0.101 0.019  0.729 
σDie Grünen/FDP  0.108 0.029  0.776 
σ2Die Grünen  0.189 0.040   
Level 2 – Individual 
-P/P 1.000 0.000 °  
Level 1 – Multinomial Variance 
σ2e  1.000 0.000 °  
° constrained 
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intention over an SPD-vote intention; it decreases the relative chance for a FDP voting 
intention. If the share of the employed population working in sector 2 increases, the rela-
tive chance for a voting intention for Die Grünen decreases.  
The first effect can be explained as a class contextual effect. The CDU/CSU can be 
labelled as the party that defends or (pretends to defend) the farmers' interests most. An 
increase in the respondent's chance to report a CDU/CSU vote intention in districts with 
more farmers can be interpreted as a consensual class contextual effect. This implies con-
trolling for he or she being a farmer him or herself, which is the case as this individual 
variable is part of the model. The negative sector 1 coefficient for FDP is neither a confir-
mation, nor a falsification of this hypothesis. Another confirmation of a class contextual 
effect could have been possible for the parameter results for the percentage working in 
sector 2. The SPD is acknowledged as the labourers' party and following the class contex-
tual theory one would expect that support for other parties decreases if the sector 2 per-
centage increases. The data confirm this hypothesis only for Die Grünen. We do not find a 
significant negative correlation between this percentage and support for CDU/CSU or 
FDP. This variable is only a proxy, the percentage working in sector 2 doesn't equal the 
percentage labourers, but a high correlation between these percentages can legitimately be 
expected, which led to the expectation of a negative effect of the sector 2 percentage for 
CDU/CSU and FDP. All in all our results provide only a weak confirmation for the class 
contextual effect hypotheses. 
Nevertheless we found a few significant correlations between the employment structure 
and party preferences. As a result the inclusion of these variables also affects the random 
part of the model. The variances at the district level decrease, the covariances show a small 
increase though. Another small part of the variation between districts is explained with 
these variables. But again the similar decrease in standard errors would justify the conclu-
sion that, controlling for all variables in the model, there are still differences between dis-
tricts. In the next analysis, analysis 4 we try to explain these differences with the number of 
foreigners in the district and the unemployment level. The results of this analysis are 
reported in Table 4. 
Also in model 4 the fixed effects of the individual variables remain roughly the same 
and their interpretation is entirely similar. The results for the district variables have 
changed though. This is an indication of multicolinearity between these variables and the 
other district variables, proportion of foreigners and unemployment level. The support for 
Die Grünen is still smaller among respondents living in a district with a higher percentage 
working in industrial manufactories are respondents are also less like to report an FDP vote 
intention, when living in a district with a higher percentage of the employed population 
working in agriculture, forestry and fishing. But the farmers-CDU/CSU class contextual  
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Table 4: Results of the Model with Individual Characteristics, Employment Sectors, 
Unemployment Level and Proportion of Foreigners 
Fixed Part 
 CDU/CSU FDP Die Grünen 
 parameter s.e.  parameter s.e.  parameter s.e.  
Level 1 – Individual 
constant -0.032 0.210  -0.966 0.369 * 0.283 0.304  
female -0.042 0.050  -0.190 0.094 * 0.186 0.070 ** 
young 0.080 0.060  -0.228 0.119  -0.070 0.077  
old 0.582 0.063 ** 0.629 0.112 ** -0.772 0.116 ** 
low education -0.232 0.054 ** -0.359 0.111 ** -0.553 0.092 ** 
high education -0.055 0.058  -0.649 0.104 ** 0.751 0.077 ** 
married 0.066 0.046  -0.154 0.088  -0.312 0.069 ** 
full time 0.043 0.062  -0.031 0.120  -0.398 0.079 ** 
half time -0.278 0.090 ** -0.356 0.186 ** -0.124 0.116  
retired 0.056 0.079  -0.472 0.153 ** -0.880 0.175 ** 
self employed 1.027 0.076 ** 1.282 0.116 ** 0.518 0.117 ** 
farmer 1.646 0.198 ** 1.826 0.298 ** 1.397 0.375 ** 
labourer -0.286 0.060 ** -0.451 0.136 * -0.018 0.101  
catholic 0.758 0.072 ** 0.329 0.126 ** -0.225 0.087 * 
Protestant 0.289 0.070 ** 0.165 0.122 ** -0.502 0.085 ** 
regular attender 0.990 0.062 ** 0.490 0.122  -0.100 0.121  
Level 2 – District 
sector 1 -0.004 0.010  -0.092 0.021 0.007 0.016  
sector 2 -0.004 0.003  0.001 0.005 -0.012 0.004 ** 
unemployment -0.086 0.010 ** -0.101 0.018 * -0.074 0.016 ** 
prop. of foreigners 0.003 0.006  -0.006 0.011 * 0.030 0.009 ** 
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01 
Random Part 
 parameter s.e.  corr 
Level 3 – District     
σ2CDU 0.021 0.011   
σFDP/CDU  0.000 0.000   
σ2FDP  0.000 0.000   
σDie Grünen/CDU  -0.004 0.013  -0.147 
σDie Grünen/FDP  0.000 0.000   
σ2Die Grünen  0.062 0.027   
Level 2 – Individual 
-P/P 1.000 0.000 °  
Level 1 – Multinomial Variance 
σ2e  1.000 0.000 °  
° constrained 
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effect disappeared. In the current model there is even a negative, though not significant, 
parameter. 
Apparently the structural variables, unemployment level and proportion of foreigners, 
change the previous results for the district variables. Apart from that they have clear effects 
themselves. The parameter for unemployment level is significantly negative for all parties. 
So, controlling for all individual and district variables in the model, respondents are rela-
tively less likely to support CDU/CSU, FPD and Die Grünen, when they are living in dis-
tricts with higher unemployment. Consequently the SPD appears to be stronger and 
attracting more voters in districts with high unemployment! The parameter for the propor-
tion of foreigners is only significant for Die Grünen. Support for this party is larger in dis-
tricts with a larger number of foreigners.  
The impact of these two variables also becomes clear when looking at the random part 
of the model. Almost all variation between districts is explained. For the FDP this is liter-
ally the case. The variance in FDP support between districts after controlling for all the 
variables in the model is estimated to be zero. But also the estimates of the variances of the 
CDU/CSU and the Die Grünen have decreased tremendously. Both variances amount to 
about twice their standard errors, and as such a significance test is only indicative, there is 
little reason to conclude additional differences between districts after the inclusion of all 
variables in the model. The residual plot with error bars for Die Grünen (Figure 4) proves 
graphical evidence.  
When comparing districts at the left hand and right hand tails of the graph only very few 
significantly different districts can be discerned. The district with the highest residual 
shows no overlap with the districts with the three smallest residuals so they are signifi-
cantly different, but that’s about it. For Die Grünen the inclusion of the last two variables 
decreased the unexplained variation between districts to an almost unimportant dimension. 
For the other parties this is even more the case. 
The results of analysis 4 show that the proportion of foreigners and the unemployment 
level are more important district predictors than the employment structure. This calls for an 
explanation. The SPD-unemployment effect is fully in line with the results of Pattie, Field-
house and Johnston, reported in section 2. The SPD was in 1994 in the opposition and it 
appears to be stronger in regions with a higher unemployment level. This confirms the 
local equivalent of the economic vote model. Furthermore one can argue that the SPD is 
the party that used the unemployment problem most frequently as a campaign topic, much 
more than Die Grünen, who were also in the opposition at that time. An additional 
hypothesis might be that respondents living in a district with a higher unemployment are 
more aware of the problem. Therefore they might also be more likely to direct their voting 
behaviour or preference to a party which addresses this problem. This is a hypothesis 
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which is not fully testable with our data, but additional support is found in the fact that 
almost 58% of the SPD supporters in West-Germany chose unemployment as the most 
important problem in Germany at that time. This is the highest percentage of the four par-
ties, the general mean amounts to 52%. 
 
Figure 4: District Residuals with Error Bars for Die Grünen in the Model with Individual 
Characteristics, Employment Sectors, Unemployment Level and Proportion of 
Foreigners 
 
The effect of the larger support for Die Grünen in districts with more immigrants is 
probably harder to explain. It is however remarkable that Die Grünen have the most 
explicit program when it comes to integration of foreigners (see Küchler, 1998). This party 
can probably be labelled as the most “immigrant-friendly.” Therefore we could attempt to 
explain this effect with the theories that have been used to explain context effects on Afro-
American-friendly voting behaviour or—conversely—extreme-right voting behaviour in 
Europe. Our results seem to fit the positive contextual effect hypothesis, but it is again only 
a very partial confirmation. An even so plausible hypothesis could be that the Die Grünen 
voters tend to be more cosmopolitan (“städtisch und weltoffen,” ibid: 308) and therefore 
are more inclined to live in or to move to regions with more foreigners. As said before 
though a thorough examination of the relation between the ethnic composition of a 
regional unit and voting would also require an analysis of apparent anti-immigrant voting, 
which was technically unfeasible. 
22 
Table 5: Results of the Model with Individual Characteristics, Employment Sectors, 
Unemployment Level, Proportion of Foreigners and Party Support 
Fixed Part 
 CDU/CSU FDP Die Grünen 
 parameter s.e.  parameter s.e.  parameter s.e.  
Level 1 – Individual 
constant -1.444 0.286 ** -1.707 0.467 ** -1.187 0.378 ** 
female -0.037 0.050  -0.190 0.094 * 0.185 0.070 * 
young 0.080 0.060  -0.228 0.119  -0.069 0.077  
old 0.586 0.063 ** 0.621 0.112 ** -0.776 0.115 ** 
low education -0.228 0.054 ** -0.350 0.111 ** -0.540 0.092 ** 
high education -0.055 0.058  0.649 0.104 ** 0.730 0.077 ** 
married 0.065 0.046  -0.154 0.088 ** -0.301 0.069 ** 
full time 0.039 0.062  -0.039 0.120  -0.409 0.079 ** 
half time -0.278 0.090 ** -0.358 0.186  -0.134 0.115  
retired 0.049 0.079  -0.463 0.153 ** -0.889 0.173 ** 
self employed 1.024 0.076 ** 1.267 0.117 ** 0.501 0.117 ** 
farmer 1.626 0.198 ** 1.778 0.302 ** 1.377 0.379 ** 
labourer -0.284 0.060 ** -0.450 0.136 * -0.021 0.100  
catholic 0.691 0.072 ** 0.345 0.127  -0.203 0.087 * 
Protestant 0.307 0.070 ** 0.158 0.122  -0.507 0.084 ** 
regular attender 0.972 0.062 ** 0.485 0.122  -0.092 0.120  
Level 2 – District 
sector 1 -0.025 0.010 * -0.081 0.021 ** 0.028 0.016  
sector 2 -0.007 0.003 ** 0.002 0.004  0.003 0.004  
unemployment -0.045 0.011 ** -0.072 0.021 ** -0.047 0.015 ** 
foreigners 0.004 0.006  -0.013 0.011  0.009 0.009  
Share of the votes 0.030 0.004 ** 0.062 0.023 ** 0.104 0.016 ** 
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01 
Random Part 
 parameter s.e.  
Level 3 – District    
σ2CDU 0.007 0.009  
σFDP/CDU  0.000 0.000  
σ2FDP  0.000 0.000  
σDie Grünen/CDU  0.000 0.010  
σDie Grünen/FDP  0.000 0.000  
σ2Die Grünen  0.027 0.022  
Level 2 – Individual 
-P/P 1.000 0.000 ° 
Level 1 – Multinomial Variance 
σ2e  1.000 0.000 ° 
° constrained 
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In the last analysis, model 5, we introduce the Party share of the votes in the district in the 
1994 elections. With this variable we try model the “breakage effect.” If a certain party has 
strong support in a district, individuals in that district might be more likely to support that 
particular party: a hypothesis which doesn’t necessarily need to be circular, although it is 
not an explanation in itself. The variable share of the votes is thus particular for the three 
parties. For the CDU/CSU it measures the percentage CDU/CSU votes in the district, for 
the FDP the percentage FDP-votes and for Die Grünen their percentage at the 1994 elec-
tions. The results of the model with this variable are in Table 5. 
The inclusion of this variable further affects the results for the district variables in the 
model. The results for the individual variables and their interpretation remain the same. 
Again one of the results with the employment structure variables changes due to the inclu-
sion of the new variables. There is no negative correlation sector 2 percentage-support for 
Die Grünen anymore, but there are negative correlations between the sector 2 and sector 1 
percentages and support for the CDU/CSU. The last effect is completely contrary to the so-
interpreted class contextual effect we found in model 3. This is another indication that the 
results with the employment sector variables are not stable enough and too liable to multi-
colinearity to draw conclusions. Apart from that the proportion of foreigners has lost its 
effect. In this model there is no positive correlation anymore between this proportion and 
support for Die Grünen. All the negative parameter estimates for the unemployment level 
remain intact though. So the conclusion about stronger SPD support in districts with a 
higher unemployment stands up! 
The general party support has a very clear impact itself as well. All three parameter 
estimates are positive and significant. Controlling for all individual and district variables in 
the model and individual is more likely to express a voting intention for a party if that 
party generally has stronger support in the district. As said in section 2 and section 4 this 
finding still calls for a further explanation, but it is apparent for all parties anyway. 
The effect on the random part is very clear as well. In model 5 there is no substantial 
variance for any of the parties, and consequently no interesting covariance between district 
residuals either. The inclusion of the share of the votes for each party explained the main 
part of the variation between districts. 
One could easily argue in favour of another successions of models. Since the independ-
ent district variables are correlated and the results are not stable across all models, another 
model succession might alter some conclusions as well. Therefore we also fitted some 
models, which are not presented here, e.g. a model without the sector variables, a model 
with the sector variables and the share of the votes but without the unemployment level 
and the proportion of foreigners. The general conclusions remain the same. The results for 
the employment structure variables are not stable, the share of the votes seems to be the 
most important district variable (always significant and in line with the expectations) and 
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the result for the unemployment level remains intact across all models as well. Apart from 
the “breakage effect,” this is the only stable contextual effect we find. Support for the SPD 
tends to be higher in districts with higher unemployment levels regardless of all individual 
and district variables. 
6 Conclusion and discussion 
In this paper we examined contextual effects on voting intentions in Germany. Our results 
showed that a small part of the variance of this independent variable can be attributed to 
the regional level, the district in our analysis. Depending on the party of interest (or more 
accurately the logit of interest), about 4 to 7 percent of the variation can be called regional 
variation. Yet another portion of this regional variation results from differences between 
the individuals that live in the various districts. Consequently, the impact of so-called con-
textual effects on the vote is limited. But it is there! For all parties we found evidence of 
regional variation even after controlling for a fair amount of individual socio demograph-
ical background characteristics. Contrary to the claims of Klein and Pötsche (2000), our 
analyses postulate that there are still contextual effects on the vote in contemporary Ger-
many. 
Finding these effects is one thing, explaining them another. In our analyses we tried to 
elucidate the effects with various district variables. Given the rather high correlation 
between the independent district variables results shift between the different models we 
presented, but two findings are recurrent throughout all analyses. Firstly, regardless of all 
other variables in the models support for the SPD is stronger in districts with a higher 
unemployment level. Secondly, also when controlling for all variables, the general support 
for a particular party in a district affects the individual’s chance to support it. The first 
finding confirms the local equivalent of the economic vote model as defined by Pattie et al. 
(1995). According to this theory parties in government are performing badly when eco-
nomic conditions are getting worse (and unemployment is growing), whereas the parties in 
the opposition profit from this situation. According to Pattie et al. this theory might be 
(even) more valid when the local economic situation is concerned. Our results confirm this 
hypothesis with the SPD being the main party in the opposition in 1994. During the elec-
tion campaign it also put a larger emphasis on the unemployment topic than Die Grünen, 
the other major opposition party in western Germany at that time. The impact of the gen-
eral support for a party in a region on the individual preference confirms what has been 
called the breakage effect, majority effect or partisan reinforcement effect. 
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The identification of both effects is however not a real explanation of the contextual 
impact on the vote. Which mechanisms determine these contextual influences? As far as 
the unemployment level is concerned, there is reason to assume that the local context 
affects the significance individuals attach to a particular problem which in turn has an 
effect on their voting preferences. As the same data show, the proportion of people that 
point to unemployment as the most serious problem in Germany is the highest among SPD 
supporters. For the effect of the general party support in a region, we have to rely on earlier 
research and theories that point to identification, social interaction and party activity. These 
theories are however not testable with our data. 
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